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EDITORIAL: Conscience and Proper Medical Treatment 
 
A controversy that cuts across medical practice and law is the question of the proper 
reach and role of conscience in medical practice.  This is a particularly acute issue in 
the context of a publicly funded health care system where comprehensive access to 
treatment is supposed to be guaranteed.  This special issue brings together papers that 
were developed from two conferences which looked at this overarching issue.  The 
first, held in Manchester and funded by a grant from the Wellcome Trust, explored 
how certain treatments, procedures, and practices come to be viewed as ‘proper 
medical treatment’.1  The second, held in Birmingham and funded by the AHRC as 
part of a seminar series on faith and religion in health care,2 examined the role of 
conscience in medical care.  We are grateful to both funders for their support, and to 
participants at these seminars for their valuable discussions and insights.  The papers 
in this issue critically assess the role of conscience in clinical practice and explore 
how we understand notions of proper medical treatment.  Ethically contentious 
medical interventions such as abortion, withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, and 
assisted dying continue to spark debates about the role of the law in legitimising 
and/or regulating such practices.  Indeed, important contributions to these debates 
have featured in this journal.3  The papers in this special issue seek to develop these 
debates by linking the concept of proper medical treatment and ideas about the                                                         
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medical conscience, as we see these as fundamental to medicine.  These matters are 
particularly significant to treatments which invite polarised views and moral 
confusion.  The question of whether such treatments are legitimate (proper medical 
treatment) and whether doctors and other health professionals are willing to provide 
them (conscience), are central to establishing the legal and ethical parameters of 
medical practice.  The papers in this issue highlights the way in which we come to 
understand the boundaries of acceptability for non-clinical concerns to bear on health 
professionals’ decision-making. 
 
In their paper, Sheelagh McGuinness and Michael Thomson examine the interplay 
between the medical profession and abortion law reform.  A key focus is how 
abortion came under medical control and how therapeutic abortions came to constitute 
good medical practice.  They consider the politics of the development of abortion 
services, including the motivations of those with a conscientious commitment to 
providing abortion care.  They also examine the differing views within the medical 
profession about the legitimacy of abortion care, and highlight distinct motivations 
within different medical specialisms.  McGuinness and Thomson conclude with 
observations on how lack of preparedness post enactment of the Abortion Act 1967 
contributed to the current models of abortion care. 
 
Picking up on the political nature of conscientious objection in professional roles, 
Jonathan Montgomery considers the particular role that statutory protections played in 
the political settlement that led to the Abortion Act.  Although he focuses on section 4 
of the Act, Montgomery’s argument speaks to broader concerns about the legitimacy 
of professionals in a socialised health service refusing to provide certain sorts of care.  
He emphasises the pivotal role that conscience plays within medical practice and, in 
particular, within medical discretion.  Montgomery is sceptical of the ongoing need 
for specific statutory protections of conscientious objection, and draws on the recent 
case of Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan to suggest that issues of conscience 
would be better dealt with using employment law mechanisms rather than specific 
statutory protections.4 
 
Moving the focus from abortion, in their paper Sara Fovargue and Mary Neal provide 
a mechanism for assessing the legitimacy of conscience based exemptions to medical 
practices.  Their arguments are generally applicable, and the starting point of their 
analysis is the liminal status of certain medical procedures.  In keeping with a theme 
throughout all of the first three articles, they highlight the contested status of abortion 
as a form of proper medical treatment.  Fovargue and Neal then move on to review 
various arguments for how we might assess that a particular belief is conscientiously 
held.  They emphasise the strength of conscientious conviction and the potential for 
negative personal consequences of being forced to act against these beliefs.  Fovargue 
and Neal conclude with a consideration of the limits of conscientious refusal of care, 
and the duties that objecting clinicians must meet. 
 
In continuing this broadening of the analysis, Stephen Smith considers conscientious 
objection in non-abortion type cases, and draws on the case of Aintree v James to 
consider how we might assess conscience claims that are not subject to predictable 
and generalisable rules.5  He problematizes the approach that the courts have taken 
towards these claims to date by specifically framing them as falling within a ‘best                                                         
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interests’ assessment.  Smith argues that a more fruitful way of understanding these 
refusals of care is as a form of conscientious practice.  It is a refusal to provide that 
treatment to that patient at that time, when a health professional might previously 
have provided that treatment to that patient but at a different moment in time.  He 
develops this alternative conceptual model for decision making in James-type cases.  
Smith’s paper thus builds on themes of earlier papers which emphasise the role that 
conscientious thinking plays in medical decision-making and medical discretion.  
 
Richard Huxtable and Alexandra Mullock also consider conscientious objection at the 
end-of-life in the context of assisted dying.  Their examination links to McGuinness 
and Thomson’s consideration of the medical profession’s impact on the development 
of abortion law.  Huxtable and Mullock consider the likely necessity of conscientious 
protections if a law on assisted dying were to be enacted.  As with the other 
contributors to this special issue, they are cognisant of the importance of 
conscientious belief to those who hold them and the negative impacts that acting 
against these beliefs can have.  However, they argue that any claims of conscientious 
objection are duly circumscribed by the professional role, and that any legal 
accommodations should be clear about this.  Huxtable and Mullock provide a 
framework for medical professional engagement with law reform with regards to 
assisted dying. 
 
In the final article, José Miola adopts a broader perspective on conscience in medical 
practice, and considers the implications for conscience when health professionals do 
bad things and fail to live up to the assumption of beneficence traditionally bestowed 
on the profession by the law.  He discusses some of the recent health scandals and 
how the ‘regulation’ of medical decision-making has evolved, from the era of judicial 
deference to the profession, to the law’s more recent willingness to intervene in 
medical decision-making. In so doing, he assesses the space remaining for a doctor to 
exercise her conscience.  While accepting that a more interventionist approach, which 
limits the doctor’s freedom of conscience, may be justifiable in the light of these 
scandals, Miola cautions that if the space for health professionals to exercise their 
conscience is to be limited, something else will fill the void.  If this becomes a more 
consumer based argument from patients then medicine may become an amoral 
domain, driven by patient choice.  We should thus be careful what we wish for.  
 
The papers presented in this special issue address and raise some testing questions 
regarding both proper medical treatment and matters of conscience.  At the extremes, 
it could be argued that conscience-rights should pervade medical practice, 
alternatively that there is no proper role for health professionals, as public servants, to 
allow conscientious motivations to impact on their practice.6  The papers collected 
here suggest that neither extreme position can straightforwardly hold.  An 
examination of proper medical practice and the role of law in protecting doctors’ and 
patients’ respective rights and responsibilities, is incomplete without a full and clear 
understanding of how conscience rights can and should manifest themselves in the 
operation of medical law.  Such work is not exhausted by reference to statutory 
conscience clauses.  Doctors and patients alike require a better understanding of the 
moral, and ultimately legal, basis and limits of conscientious objection in medicine.  
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We hope that this special issue contributes to and moves these vitally important 
debates forward. 
 
Sara Fovargue, Sheelagh McGuinness, Alexandra Mullock, Stephen Smith 
